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The National Labor Relations Act and Flexible Work Arrangements: 
An Overview of Existing Law and Proposals for Reform
The scheduling of work hours is important to employers and employees alike. Employers must ensure sufﬁcient 
stafﬁng to meet workload demands; employees must balance work with other aspects of their lives. Over the 
past several years, the tendency to view these needs as mutually exclusive has slowly given way to increased 
discussion of and experimentation with ﬂexible work arrangements as an effective way to balance work-life 
demands. While these workplace ﬂexibility initiatives take many forms, the majority of them require collabora-
tion between employers and employees regarding work hours and conditions.1 
As employers and employees explore these new ways of working, they do so against a backdrop of existing 
laws that may support or impede their efforts. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is one such law. Under 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, an employer commits an unfair labor practice when it dominates or supports a 
labor organization. Because the Act’s deﬁnition of labor organization broadly includes any employee-partici-
pant organization that deals with an employer on certain issues, including hours and conditions of work, the 
NLRA necessarily affects how employers and employees can work together to increase ﬂexible work arrange-
ments. This memo examines that interplay, with a particular focus on how the NLRA supports or impedes 
employer-employee workplace ﬂexibility initiatives.
Section I of the memo sets out relevant NLRA provisions and explains how these provisions impact workplace 
teams by placing certain limits on team structure, function, and level of employer involvement. To operate 
within these limits, a workplace team must exercise actual managerial authority; a team that engages in a 
back-and-forth process with management and generates proposals for management consideration must be 
independent of management control. 
Dissatisfaction with how these limits impact employer-employee collaboration and concerns over possible 
uncertainty in their application to any given workplace team has spurred vigorous debate and discussion. 
Section II reviews various arguments and proposals for reform of existing law, including calls for increased 
NLRB clarity regarding permissible workplace teams and substantial efforts to amend the NLRA. These 
proposed NLRA amendments would allow employers greater freedom to discuss “matters of mutual interest” 
with employees and have generated strong opposition and support, with both sides claiming that their solu-
tion strikes the appropriate balance for employer-employee collaboration. In the meantime, employers and 
employees continue to navigate existing law, with many employers creating workplace ﬂexibility teams. 
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I. The NLRA and Workplace Flexibility Arrangements: Application of Section 8(a)(2) and Section 2(5) to 
Workplace Teams
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, commonly known as the Wagner Act, seeks to remedy the inequality 
of bargaining power between employees and employers by strengthening the right of employees to organize 
and bargain collectively with employers.2 The Act contains several provisions aimed at reducing employer inter-
ference with employee organizing efforts, including Section 8(a)(2):
29 U.S.C. §158 [§8(a)(2)]. Unfair labor practices
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — 
 *  *  *
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute ﬁnancial or other support to it * * * 
The primary purpose of Section 8(a)(2) is the elimination of sham or company unions and other management-
controlled employee groups that might substitute for or interfere with an independent bargaining agent.3 From 
Senator Wagner’s perspective in the 1930s, “[t]he development of the company-dominated union has been one 
of the great obstacles to genuine freedom of self-organization.”4 He therefore intentionally proposed — and 
Congress adopted — a broad deﬁnition of labor organization in Section 2 of the Act that would reach a wide 
range of employee-involvement structures: 
29 U.S.C. §152 [§2]. Deﬁnitions.
When used in this subchapter — 
*  *  *
 (5) The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee 
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. 
Under these two provisions, determining whether a workplace team violates the NLRA requires a two-step 
analysis: 
(1) is the team a “labor organization” under Section 2(5); and if so 
(2) has the employer dominated or interfered with the formation of the team or contributed ﬁnancial or 
other support to it in violation of Section 8(a)(2).5 
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An employer cannot commit an unfair labor practice unless it is ﬁrst determined that a workplace ﬂexibility 
team constitutes a “labor organization.” If a particular team is not a labor organization, then there can be no 
unlawful domination or support within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2). Conversely, if a team is a labor orga-
nization, an employer violates the law only if its conduct vis-à-vis the team constitutes unlawful domination, 
interference, or support. 
A. Is the Team a “Labor Organization” under Section 2(5)?
In analyzing the deﬁnition of “labor organization” contained in Section 2(5), the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) has explained that an “entity is a labor organization if 
(1) employees participate, 
(2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of ‘dealing with’ employers, and 
(3) these dealings concern ‘conditions of work,’ grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of 
employment.”6 
The ﬁrst and third conditions — employee participation concerning hours of employment and conditions of 
work — are met by any workplace ﬂexibility team. Employees participate in these teams along with manage-
ment. The teams exist, at least in part, for the purpose of scheduling work hours, considering job redesign, 
job-sharing, or telecommuting — i.e., the hours and conditions of work. 
Thus, the critical question for any of these teams is whether the team meets the second condition — is it 
“dealing with” the employer?
As set out in greater detail below, the NLRB and the courts have consistently interpreted the meaning of 
“dealing with” along two broad lines. First, teams that share information or stand in the shoes of management 
by exercising actual managerial control are not “dealing with” employers. Second, teams that engage in back-
and-forth discussions and generate proposals for consideration by management are “dealing with” employers.
1. SHARED MANAGEMENT TEAMS ARE NOT “DEALING WITH” THE EMPLOYER.
In a line of cases dating back to the mid 1970s, the NLRB and the courts have consistently identiﬁed a limited 
number of scenarios that do not involve employee organizations “dealing with” an employer, including 
• “brainstorming” groups formed to develop ideas but not make concrete proposals to management;
• “information sharing” groups formed to provide information but not make any proposals to 
management;
• “suggestion box” procedures for allowing individual employees to make proposals to management; and 
• shared management teams created by the employer to exercise managerial authority with power “to 
decide matters for [themselves], rather than simply make proposals to management.”7
Of these, only the last structure — shared management teams — is relevant to modern workplace ﬂexibility 
teams. These teams go beyond brainstorming, information sharing, individual employee suggestions, or con-
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sideration of pure production issues. Workplace ﬂexibility teams engage in discussions and decisions regarding 
works hours and other conditions of employment (e.g., possible job redesign with reallocation of responsibilities 
or working from home). Determining whether these teams constitute “labor organizations” under the Act 
therefore turns on whether they exercise managerial authority. Two NLRB decisions — General Foods Corp., 
231 NLRB 1232 (1977) and Crown Cork & Seal, Inc., 334 NLRB 699 (2001) — set out the guiding principles for 
making this determination. 
In General Foods, the employer divided its employees into four work teams. “In theory if not always in practice, 
each team, acting by a consensus of its members, makes job assignments to individual team members, assigns 
job rotations, and schedules overtime among team members.”8 The employer also created committees to 
perform certain job functions, including interviewing job applicants and performing plant safety inspections. 
These committees consisted of members from each of the employer’s four work teams. Employees acting within 
the various teams or committees set their own starting and quitting times within limits set by the employer. 
Based on these facts, the NLRB concluded that “[t]hese are managerial functions being ﬂatly delegated to 
employees and do not involve any dealing with the employer on a group basis within the meaning of Section 
2(5), however expansively that term is applied.”9 Because the teams and committees were not “dealing with” 
the employer, they were not labor organizations under the NLRA. Because these teams were not labor organi-
zations within the meaning of section 2(5), it was perfectly legitimate for the employer to be active in creating 
these teams and participating in them.
The employer in Crown Cork also created work production teams and smaller committees. Every plant employee 
participated in one of the work production teams along with at least one member of management. Reaching 
decision by consensus, with members abstaining if unable to agree with the consensus view, Crown Cork’s work 
production teams were found to “‘decide and do’ on a wide variety of workplace issues, ‘including production, 
quality, training, attendance, safety, maintenance, and discipline short of suspension or discharge.’”10 Crown 
Cork’s committees, which were comprised of two employees from each work production team and some mem-
bers of management, made recommendations on plant policy, safety, and worker skill issues. A management 
team and the plant manager reviewed committee recommendations but rarely, if ever, overruled the commit-
tees.11 
On these facts, the NLRB found that “[a]s in General Foods, management has delegated to the committees 
… the authority to operate the plant within certain parameters.”12 Because the teams actually performed the 
functions that a manager would perform at that same level, they acted as management. It was also not a 
problem that upper management reviewed the decisions of the team. As the Board explained, subjecting the 
recommendations of these managerial teams to upper management review was the “familiar process of a 
managerial recommendation making its way up the chain of command” and not unlawful “dealing with” the 
employer.13 
Under the NLRB’s guidance in General Foods and Crown Cork, the NLRA permits workplace ﬂexibility teams 
characterized by the following factors: 
• lack of management veto power: where teams consist of management and non-management 
employees, the teams do not use a decision making process that effectively permits a management 
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veto of team decisions (e.g., a permissible team might use majority rule with management members 
constituting a minority of the members); and
• real decision making power: teams exercise the same level and type of supervisory authority and 
responsibility that a supervisor would have at that same level within the company hierarchy; and
• appropriately limited oversight: the employer treats decisions of the team in the same way that it 
would treat decisions of a supervisor at that same level within the company hierarchy.
Workplace ﬂexibility teams with these characteristics are not “dealing with” employers but are acting as part 
of the management structure. As management bodies and not “labor organizations” under the NLRA, these 
teams exercise managerial authority but may be subject to appropriate oversight by upper management. An 
employer who is willing to operate its teams within these limits may create and otherwise participate actively 
in such workplace ﬂexibility teams under the NLRA. 
2. WORKPLACE TEAMS THAT LACK MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY AND ENGAGE IN A BILATERAL PROCESS WITH 
MANAGEMENT ARE “DEALING WITH” THE EMPLOYER. 
In contrast to the above cases, and starting with the Supreme Court’s decision in 1959 in Cabot Carbon v. 
NLRB,14 the NLRB and the courts consistently have found that teams that engage in back-and-forth discussions 
with management, and generate proposals for consideration by management, “deal with” employers under 
the NLRA. Unlike teams that exercise actual managerial authority and stand in the shoes of a manager, these 
teams constitute “labor organizations” by virtue of their “dealing with” employers over certain issues, including 
hours or conditions of work. 
In Cabot Carbon, the Supreme Court held that committees created by the employer to allow employees 
to discuss “ideas and problems of mutual interest” with management were labor organizations.15 Among 
other things, the Cabot Carbon committees made proposals regarding overtime, scheduling, and sick leave.16 
Management was free to accept or reject these proposals.17 The Supreme Court rejected an interpretation of 
“dealing with” as requiring collective bargaining with an employer, ﬁnding that the committees’ proposals 
and management consideration of those proposals “establish that the Committees were ‘dealing with’ [the 
employers] … within the meaning of § 2(5).”18 The Supreme Court noted that Congress clearly intended labor 
organizations to be broader than an ofﬁcial or established collective bargaining agent.
Building on the Supreme Court’s approach in Cabot Carbon, the NLRB has concluded that teams or committees 
are “dealing” with employers whenever the teams lack actual or ﬁnal decision making power. In Electromation, 
for example, the employer established workplace committees to respond to low employee morale and concerns 
regarding newly implemented workplace policies. These committees included management and non-manage-
ment employees who discussed and voted on proposals but could not decide on or implement those policy 
ideas without upper management approval.19 Within the teams themselves, the management members set 
meeting agendas, had power to reject team decisions, and ultimately decided what, if any, team proposals 
were presented for consideration by upper management. The Board observed that this back-and-forth between 
employees and management within and outside of the teams “in order to reach bilateral solutions on the basis 
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of employee-initiated proposals … . is the essence of ‘dealing with’ within the meaning of Section 2(5).”20 
Shortly after Electromation, in E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Board summarized its own decisions on 
impermissible “dealing with,” focusing on the fact that while “bargaining” connotes a process for compromise, 
“dealing” does not.21 “Dealing” requires only a “bilateral mechanism between two parties” through which 
employees make proposals and management responds, but “compromise is not required.”22
Two years following E.I. Du Pont, the Board again concluded that a committee was dealing with an employer. 
In this case, Keeler Brass Co., the committee consisted only of employees and appeared to exercise decision 
making authority within the committee. But the committee’s lack of ﬁnal decision making authority, combined 
with management oversight of committee decisions, led the Board to conclude that the committee was 
“dealing with” management. The committee at issue, a grievance committee, had ruled in an employee’s favor 
on a grievance and had recommended rehire of an employee. The company disagreed and had sent the recom-
mendation for rehire back to the committee for reconsideration in light of past practice within the company. 
The committee heard additional testimony on the past-practice issue and, based on that testimony, reversed 
itself and denied the grievance. On these facts, the Board found that statutory “dealing” was present because 
the committee and the company “went back and forth explaining themselves until an acceptable result was 
achieved.”23 
Under the guidance from the NLRB provided through these cases, the NLRA could impede workplace ﬂexibility 
teams that lack decision making power and, instead, work with employers to develop or increase ﬂexible work 
arrangements through back-and-forth discussion and recommendations or proposals. Because these teams 
“deal with” the employer on work hours and other conditions of work (including, for example, job redesign, job 
shares, or telecommuting) they are “labor organizations” under the Act. The question then becomes whether 
these workplace ﬂexibility teams are employer-dominated within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2). That latter 
question must be answered in the afﬁrmative for an unfair labor practice to occur.
A. Has the Employer Dominated or Interfered with the Workplace Team or Otherwise Contributed 
Support Under Section 8(a)(2)?
In considering unlawful domination, the NLRB and the courts generally follow the criteria set out in the 
Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Newport News.24 In that case, the Court concluded that a team that is initi-
ated and structured by the employer is employer-dominated regardless of the employees’ satisfaction with the 
team or the employer’s intent in creating it.25 
In Newport News, the employer had created committees to allow employees to voice concerns over work 
conditions and to provide a procedure for adjustment of employer-employee disputes.26 The vast majority of 
employees expressed satisfaction with and supported continuation of the committees.27 Finding the success of 
the committees and the employer’s motives “immaterial,” the Court concluded that the employer had violated 
Section 8(a)(2) because it created and maintained control over the structure of the committees.28 
The NLRB has followed the Supreme Court’s lead in Newport News, often concluding that “a labor organization 
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that is the creation of management, whose structure and function are essentially determined by management, 
and whose continued existence depends on the whim of management, is one whose formation or administra-
tion has been dominated under Section 8(a)(2).”29 Under this approach, teams that lack structural indepen-
dence from the employer likely will be found to be employer dominated or supported within the meaning of 
Section 8(a)(2). 
Many workplace ﬂexibility teams may well lack structural independence from the employer.30 If the employer 
— not the employees — creates and introduces the basic team structure, provides general limits on the relative 
number of management and non-management participants in the team, sets out the team responsibilities, and 
retains the right to continue or abolish a team as necessary or appropriate, such a team will not be structurally 
independent from the employer.31 
Thus, as a practical matter today, the lawfulness of workplace ﬂexibility teams under current law turns on 
whether the team is a “labor organization.” If the answer is yes (i.e., the workplace team falls short of shared 
managerial control and, instead, “deals with” the employer), the employer will be subject to an unfair labor 
practice charge. This is true even if employee participation is voluntary and the overwhelming majority of 
employees want such teams. 
II.  Proposals for Reform 
How and whether federal labor law strikes the appropriate balance in protecting employee choice and reducing 
the inequality of bargaining power while allowing and encouraging employer-employee collaboration has 
generated vigorous discussion and debate. Critics of the balance struck by existing law generally have rallied 
around the NLRB’s Electromation decision, arguing that the case marked a turning point from earlier NLRB 
decisions, which evidenced a more ﬂexible approach to employer-employee teams, and that reform is neces-
sary to save the vast majority of modern employee-involvement programs.32 Supporters of existing law have 
responded that “the so-called Electromation problem … is [a] myth. It is indeed possible to have effective 
[employee Involvement] programs … without the necessity of any changes in current law.”33 
In deciding Electromation, the NLRB made clear that it was deciding only whether the particular employer-
initiated committees at issue in that case violated the NLRA and leaving broader issues regarding limits on 
modern workplace teams alone. However, three of the four-member NLRB panel wrote separate concurrences, 
with Members Devaney and Oviatt writing to stress the broad range of employee teams currently permitted 
under the Act. 34 Member Raudabaugh concluded otherwise, writing that most workplace teams currently 
violate the Act and that “Section 2(5) will have to be changed legislatively unless Section 8(a)(2) can be rein-
terpreted so as to accommodate such programs.”35
On appeal of the NLRB’s Electromation decision, several amici urged the Court of Appeals to consider the 
broader application of the Act to modern workplace teams. As had the NLRB, the Seventh Circuit declined 
this invitation, making clear that it was addressing only the particular committees at issue in the case.36 In so 
doing, the court noted the policy arguments for reconsideration of the NLRA:
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There are some serious policy arguments that suggest that today’s evolving industrial environment 
may require reconsideration of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, or at least its interpretation and 
application to certain modern employee organizations. However, this case fails to provide the 
proper forum for such re-analysis and re-interpretation. In any event, any substantial changes 
should more properly be considered by Congress.37
These two primary avenues for reforming existing law — additional NLRB guidance or legislative amendment 
— have been advanced by commentators, agency ofﬁcials, and lawmakers.  
A. Additional NLRB Guidance and Flexibility in Interpreting the NLRA
Those arguing that the appropriate avenue for any reform of existing law is through NLRB guidance and case 
law generally take the position that major reform is not necessary and that the goal of encouraging and sup-
porting modern workplace teams can be achieved under the Act as currently written.38 They ﬁnd the primary 
advantages of this route to include: the NLRB’s experience and expertise in labor law; its familiarity with 
how workplace teams operate and the appropriate balance of labor-management rights and interests; and 
the ability for the agency to make change through case-by-case adjudication, which allows for considered 
and appropriate resolution based on concrete facts.39 As even supporters of this route acknowledge, however, 
“building law by declaring what is not legal rather than comprehensively outlining what is lawful … can 
produce rather ad hoc changes, and this method of proceeding can be frustrating to companies looking for 
guidance about the permissible parameters of experimentation.”40 And despite calls for the agency to do so,41 
the NLRB has not issued afﬁrmative guidance on workplace teams. Moreover, commentators acknowledge that, 
as a politically appointed body, the NLRB may weigh management or labor interests differently under different 
administrations with a resulting risk of inconsistency and uncertainty.42
For those advocating reform through NLRB guidance, their speciﬁc substantive avenues for change focus on 
the Board’s authority to: (1) place greater weight on whether an organization actual represents employees in 
the Section 2(5) labor organization analysis; or (2) relax the strict limits on employer involvement in workplace 
teams under Section 8(a)(2).
1. NLRB REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2(5)
Member Devaney, concurring in Electromation, made the argument that actual representation or advocacy 
must be found before an organization can be considered a “labor organization” within the meaning of Section 
2(5).43 Reviewing the legislative history and focusing on descriptions of “employee representation plans” — a 
“term of art” used to describe organizations initiated by employers to act as the exclusive, in-house employee 
representative — Member Devaney concluded that Congress sought to outlaw representation plans but to allow 
other types of employer-employee structures: 
My reading of the legislative history fully supports the judge’s conclusion in General Foods that a 
“labor organization” purports to be, ﬁrst and foremost, an agent or advocate for employees, and 
should be a loyal and exclusive agent. Where an employee committee does not act as the agent or 
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advocate of other employees, an employer’s dealings with the committee will not cause the harm 
Section 8(a)(2) is intended to correct: the usurpation by the employer of the employees’ right to 
choose their own bargaining representative and the concomitant frustration of their fundamental 
freedom of choice and action guaranteed by Section 7. In determining whether an employee 
organization functioned as a representative of employees, I would look to the organization’s 
authority: have the employees, the employer, or both empowered this group to speak for other 
employees?44
In a memorandum written after this decision, the General Counsel of the NLRB noted that whether employee 
representation is an essential element for ﬁnding a Section 2(5) “labor organization” remains an open ques-
tion.45 Others have argued that the plain language of the statute — deﬁning “labor organization” to “mean any 
organization of any kind, or … employee representation committee or plan” — as well as legislative history and 
case precedent foreclose this interpretation of Section 2(5).46
2. NLRB REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(A)(2)
Various NLRB members have argued for relaxation of the Section 8(a)(2) limits on employer involvement 
with workplace teams. In his Electromation concurrence, Member Raudabaugh argued that the NLRB had 
authority to reinterpret Section 8(a)(2) and suggested a four-factor analysis that would not rely as heavily on 
the formal structure of the team but would assess whether employee rights actually were infringed.47 Former 
NLRB Chairman Gould, in his Keeler Brass concurrence, similarly argued against undue reliance on employer 
initiation of or involvement in a team as a per se indicator of unlawful domination and urged that the “focus 
should, instead, be on whether the organization allows for employee action and choice.”48 Chairman Gould 
recommended assessment of whether employees ultimately controlled the structure and function of teams, 
whether employee participation was voluntary, and whether the employer had created the team in response to 
employee organizing efforts.49 
In setting out this approach, Chairman Gould noted that because prior cases dealt with the extremes of 
employer involvement,50 the additional guidelines provided in his concurrence were necessary to clarify permis-
sible employer involvement for the majority of workplace teams. In later comments, Chairman Gould acknowl-
edged that “a majority of the Board has not yet subscribed to the views that I have expressed on employer 
initiatives,” and cited this as a reason that he would support a “clarifying amendment” of the NLRA to simplify 
the requirements of existing law and allow employer initiatives that met his test for safeguarding employee 
rights.51 
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B.  Efforts to Amend the NLRA
Congress has made two serious efforts to amend the NLRA. An amendment proposed as part of the 1947 
Taft-Hartley Act passed the House but was removed during conference with the Senate.52 The TEAM Act passed 
both houses of Congress in 1996 before being vetoed by President Clinton.53 The aim of these amendments is 
strikingly similar, as shown and discussed below, with both allowing employers to discuss “matters of mutual 
interest” with their employees.
1. THE 1947 PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 8’S UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
The Wagner Act was ﬁrst amended in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations Act, commonly known as the 
Taft-Hartley Act, which attempted to prevent “industrial strife” by further deﬁning the rights of employees and 
employers.54 The House version of the bill proposed a new section 8(d)(3),55 which would have amended Section 
8’s unfair labor practices with the following proviso:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following shall not constitute or be evidence 
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act:
  *   *   *
(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters  
of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working conditions,  
if the Board has not certiﬁed or the employer has not recognized a representative as their 
representative under section 9. 
This amendment would have permitted employers in non-union workplaces to set up employee committees to 
discuss matters typically reserved for collective bargaining.56 
The Senate version of the bill contained no corresponding provision and Section 8(d)(3) was eliminated in 
conference.57 The two reasons given for the elimination were that the NLRA “by its terms” already permitted 
employees and employers to meet and the fact that a Senate amendment to Section 9(a) (which was accepted 
in conference) explicitly permitted employers to hear and address employee grievances within a certain frame-
work.58 The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ rejection of Section 8(d)(3) as evidence of its intent to allow 
certain grievance adjustments but to maintain existing prohibitions on dealings with employer-dominated 
labor organizations.59
2.  TEAMWORK FOR EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS (TEAM) ACT
The intervening years brought several cases analyzing the text of Section 8(a)(2) and Section 2(5), but the 
1992 NLRB decision in Electromation was the ﬁrst that spurred another proposed amendment to the NLRA’s 
treatment of employee teams.60 The stated purpose of the Teamwork for Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act, 
ﬁrst proposed in 1993 and then re-introduced in 1995 and 1997, was to foster cooperative labor-management 
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relations and clarify the legality of employee involvement groups.61 The legislation was a direct response to the 
Electromation decision.62 
The bill sought to amend Section 8(a)(2) by adding the following proviso (change shown by italics):63
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
 *   *   *
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute ﬁnancial or other support to it; … Provided further, That it shall not constitute 
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish, 
assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees 
who participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management 
participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, 
productivity, efﬁciency, safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority 
to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter into 
collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining 
agreements between the employer and any labor organization, except that in a case in which 
a labor organization is the representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this 
proviso shall not apply. 
Support or opposition to the Act has generally fallen along party lines.64 
Republican supporters of the Act have been joined by the National Chamber of Commerce, the TEAM Coalition 
(a group of employers who supported the Act), and the heads of several large companies, including IBM, Kodak, 
and Motorola. Democrats, who generally oppose the Act, have been supported by the AFL-CIO and a number of 
labor law scholars.65
 a. Arguments for the TEAM Act
Supporters of the TEAM Act generally argue: (1) the basic premise of the NLRA — that the relationship between 
employers and employees is necessarily adversarial — is outdated and that the law should be amended to 
reﬂect the shift to greater collaboration between employers and employees; (2) modern workplace teams 
beneﬁt employees and employers but the majority of these teams are unlawful under existing law; and (3) the 
proposed amendment would not result in the return of company or sham unions.  Speciﬁc arguments of the 
primary proponents include:
• Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), sponsor of the TEAM Act: The needs of the global economy require 
companies to develop a cooperative atmosphere in the workplace. The NLRB’s interpretation of the 
NLRA prevents companies from utilizing at least one method of cooperation — workplace teams. The 
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TEAM Act removes the barriers in federal law that prevent workers and employers from meeting in 
committees to discuss workplace issues.66
• Rep. Steve Gunderson (R-WI), sponsor of the TEAM Act: Section 8(a)(2) makes employee involvement 
in nonunion settings illegal. Yet employers and employees would prefer to communicate with each 
other through cooperation rather than through unions. The TEAM Act’s goals are only to remove the 
restrictions on this cooperation, which is in the best interests of companies, workers, and the country’s 
global competitive ability.67
• House and Senate Committee Reports: The TEAM Act would not reinstate company unions, but it 
would allow companies to adapt to a global information economy that was signiﬁcantly different 
from the manufacturing-heavy environment present when the NLRA was passed. To ensure against 
the reinstatement of company unions while still utilizing workplace teams, the bill guarantees that 
employees remain free to choose collective bargaining representatives if they wish, and employers 
would still violate the Act if they attempted to use teams as an end-run around the employees’ chosen 
representative. Additionally, the organizations do not have the authority to enter into collective 
bargaining agreements on behalf of the employees, guaranteeing that they will not become company-
dominated unions.68
• U.S. Chamber of Commerce/TEAM Coalition/Business Interests: Employees beneﬁt from employee 
involvement plans because they have real decision-making authority through these teams. 
Management has an interest in limiting its exercise of authority over these teams when, in return, 
the workforce is more productive and satisﬁed.69 These groups also echo the arguments from other 
supporters of the Act, stating that the TEAM Act is necessary to clarify the law.70
 b. Arguments Against the TEAM Act
Opponents of the Act generally argue: (1) the TEAM Act is unnecessary because a wide range of employer-
employee teams are currently allowed under the NLRA; (2) Electromation only reafﬁrms that employer-created 
and employer-controlled teams are illegal, which strikes the right balance between promoting cooperation and 
preventing domination of employees; and (3) the Team Act would inappropriately allow companies to establish 
company-dominated unions. The arguments of speciﬁc opponents include:
• Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor: Under the NLRA, many employee-employer groups which discuss 
issues of quality, productivity, and efﬁciency are legal; thus, there is no need for the TEAM Act. Two 
changes will result from the passage of the Act: 1) employers would be permitted to form company 
unions, and 2) employers in unionized workplaces would be able to establish an alternative, company-
dominated organization.71
• NLRB Chairman William B. Gould: While Chairman Gould generally agreed that “there are pitfalls 
and ambiguities in Section 8(a)(2) which make its amendment desirable … . [t]he Republican Party’s 
answer to this problem — the so-called “TEAM Act” — however, is classic overkill of a kind which 
could promote the discredited company unions which the National Labor Relations Act was designed 
to repress.”72 Chairman Gould endorsed, instead, a more limited amendment of the NLRA to allow 
employer-assisted committees to meet and discuss any subject “so long as employee autonomy is 
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protected and respected” and noted, with approval, Representative Sawyer’s amendment in the nature 
of a substitute for the TEAM Act for taking this approach.73 (The Sawyer amendment failed on a party-
line vote of 204-221.)
• House Committee Minority Report: The Electromation decision does not eliminate employer-employee 
cooperation programs. It only reafﬁrms the invalidation of employer-created and employer-controlled 
programs. These programs are exactly the kinds of groups the NLRA should prohibit because they 
create a semblance of joint decision-making without actually giving employees any power over ﬁnal 
decisions. The NLRA’s current provisions require some authority to be delegated to employees in these 
groups; the TEAM Act’s changes would eliminate this requirement and would allow employers to keep 
signiﬁcant power over employees under the guise of including them in the process.74
• AFL-CIO/Unions: The NLRA already permits employers to “transfer decision-making power to the 
workers” and to “involv[e] employees intellectually in the business”; Electromation does not change 
the ability of employees to form legitimate employee involvement plans to achieve these goals. The 
only reason to pass the TEAM Act would be to create “puppet” governments which would rubber-
stamp management policies.75
 c. Proposed Amendments to the TEAM Act
During both House and Senate consideration of the Team Act, Democratic Members offered substitute amend-
ments to the NLRA in lieu of the TEAM Act proposal. For the most part, these Democratic amendments to the 
NLRA explicitly sanctioned teams that were already lawful under existing law — for example, brainstorming 
or information sharing groups and productivity teams. These substitute amendments, however, also clariﬁed 
that certain work teams, in which both employees and supervisors participated, were permitted. Finally, these 
substitute amendments added some additional protections for employee rights.
The House alternative was offered by Representative Thomas Sawyer (D-OH) and the Senate alternative was 
offered by Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND). There were some slight differences between the Sawyer and Dorgan 
substitutes in describing the permissible teams (see below). Both amendments, however, were defeated. The 
Sawyer Amendment failed by a vote of 204-221.76 The Dorgan Amendment failed by a vote of 36 to 63.77 
• Sawyer Amendment: Representative Sawyer’s amendment would have amended Section 8(a)(2) 
to provide that it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer “to establish, assist, maintain, or 
participate” in three types of teams, described as follows:
“(i) a method of work organization based upon employee-managed work units, notwithstanding 
the fact that such work units may hold periodic meetings in which all employees assigned to 
the unit discuss and, subject to agreement with the exclusive bargaining representative, if any, 
decide upon conditions of work within the work unit;
(ii) a method of work organization based upon supervisor-managed work units, notwithstanding 
the fact that such work units may hold periodic meetings of all employees and supervisors 
assigned to the unit to discuss the unit’s work responsibilities and in the course of such 
meetings on occasion discuss conditions of work within the work unit; or 
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(iii) committees created to recommend or to decide upon means of improving the design, 
quality, or method of producing, distributing, or selling the employer’s product of service, 
notwithstanding the fact that such committees on isolated occasions, in considering design 
quality, or production issues, may discuss directly related issues concerning conditions of 
work.”
The Sawyer amendment further provided that the proviso (i.e., allowing these three types of teams 
as an exception to Section 8(a)(2)) would not apply where an employer infringed on employee 
rights by, for example, interfering with or coercing an employee because of his or her participation 
or non-participation in a team.78 
NLRB Chairman William B. Gould IV noted the Sawyer amendment with approval, characterizing 
it as a “constructive approach” that “was designed to encourage productivity and quality teams 
without opening the door to sham unions.”79
• Dorgan Amendment: Senator Dorgan’s amendment also permitted certain employer-employee 
meetings and teams. Instead of amending Section 8(a)(2) to allow speciﬁc teams, however, Senator 
Dorgan added a new subsection to Section 8 providing that it would “not constitute or be evidence of 
an unfair labor practice” for an employer to:
“(A) … meet with the employees as a group, or to meet with each of the employees individually, to 
share information, to brainstorm, or receive suggestions or opinions from individual employees, 
with respect to matters of mutual interest, including matters relating to working conditions.
(B) … assign employees to work units and to hold regular meetings of the employees assigned to 
a work unit to discuss matters relating to the work responsibilities of the unit. The meetings, 
may, on occasion, include discussions with respect to the conditions of work of the employees 
assigned to the unit.
(C) … establish a committee composed of employees of the employer to make recommendations or 
determinations on ways of improving the quality of, or method of producing and distributing, 
the employer’s product or service and to hold regular meetings of the committee to discuss 
matters relating to the committee. The meetings may, on occasion, include discussions with 
respect to any directly related issues concerning conditions of work of the employees.”
The Dorgan amendment contained the same protection for employees as the Sawyer amendment, 
prohibiting resort to the proviso where the employer infringed on employee rights under the 
NLRA.80
d.  President Clinton’s Veto
The TEAM Act was ﬁrst introduced in the House and the Senate in 1993, after the NLRB’s Electromation deci-
sion, but it was referred to the respective committees without any other action taken.81 Reintroduced in 1995, 
it passed both the House and Senate by slim majorities (221-202 and 53-46, respectively) along mainly party-
line votes.82 President Clinton vetoed it in July 1996, and it was sent back to Congress,83 with the following 
message explaining his reasons for rejecting this change to existing law: 
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• Current law provides for a wide variety of cooperative workplace efforts, particularly efforts that 
delegate a signiﬁcant amount of managerial responsibility to the team. 
• The Act would undermine collective bargaining by allowing companies to establish company-
dominated unions where no union currently exists.
• To the extent that the NLRA has fostered uncertainty as to the status of employee involvement plans, 
the proper avenue for addressing the issue is guidance from the NLRB instead of legislation.84
Conclusion
While the TEAM Act was reintroduced the following year, it failed to gain signiﬁcant momentum and has  
not been reintroduced since.85 Meanwhile, the NLRB’s subsequent decision in Crown Cork & Seal86 has been 
heralded by some as “an important step forward in the evolution of the Board’s approach regarding employee-
participation committees”87 and characterized by others as doing “little to alter the existing landscape in 
this area of NLRB law.”88 Though disagreeing on whether Crown Cork reforms existing law, both sides agree 
that workplace teams that fall within its guidelines — shared management teams, as discussed above — are 
permitted.89 Of course, to the degree that dissatisfaction remains with these limits or any uncertainty in 
their application to particular teams, calls for reform through more afﬁrmative NLRB guidance or legislation 
undoubtedly will recur.90 
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